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DA N  PR I E L *  
Rights-based approaches to tort law have been prominent in recent years in theoretical 
discussions of tort law. Much of this work has been either highly abstract or focused on a 
small number of torts like negligence or trespass. Allan Beever’s The Law of Private 
Nuisance attempts to extend this approach to the tort of private nuisance. Central to his 
account is the view that the law of nuisance is concerned with prioritising land uses, and 
that what the law calls ‘nuisance’ is really a case of one land use conflicting with another, 
higher-ranked one. This essay argues that despite claims to being internal to the law, this 
approach does not match the law. Furthermore, assessed on its own, it suffers from 
serious problems that make it difficult to implement in addressing the kind of real-world 
problems that nuisance law is meant to solve. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
Some 30 years ago Ernest Weinrib embarked on a highly ambitious research 
program. Weinrib’s provocative contention was that all of ‘private law’1 could 
be explained in terms of a single normative idea: corrective justice. Though 
his abstract arguments claimed to be internal to the law, it was mostly based 
on readings (contentious, I think) of the works of Aristotle and Immanuel 
Kant, neither a philosopher until then thought to have had much influence on 
the development of the common law. And though Weinrib claimed to have 
captured the idea of private law as a whole, he focused almost exclusively on 
tort law, and within tort law almost exclusively on negligence. Weinrib 
explained that ‘liability for negligence poses a particularly severe challenge’ for 
his formalist conception of corrective justice. Therefore, ‘[i]f formalism 
illuminates negligence law, it presumably illuminates less problematic bases of 
[private law] liability as well’.2 Despite this assurance, Weinrib’s limited focus 
left him open to two kinds of challenge. One was that even if providing an 
adequate explanation of negligence, he was wrong to claim that corrective 
justice provides a unifying principle for all of private law. The second chal-
lenge was that even with regard to negligence his account could retain 
whatever plausibility it had only by remaining at Olympian heights of 
abstraction, but could not adequately explain many more fine-grained features 
of the law. 
 
 1 The term private law is potentially misleading. If used simply as shorthand for contract, tort, 
restitution, and property, it is fairly innocuous; if taken to indicate that these areas of law 
form a certain domain of law that is somehow different from the rest of the law, it is poten-
tially misleading. See below Part IV. 
 2 Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, revised ed, 2012) 20. 
There is a short discussion of restitution and contract: at 136–42. 
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Much of Weinrib’s work in subsequent years has been dedicated to restat-
ing and substantiating his views, as well as extending them to other areas of 
private law.3 In a series of writings, Allan Beever, probably Weinrib’s most 
committed disciple,4 has attempted to do the same. Echoing Weinrib, Beever 
stated in his first book that in his view ‘at least almost all of the law of tort, and 
the private law more generally, is based on corrective justice’.5 He has since 
attempted to make true of this claim. Thus, a recent book, Forgotten Justice,6 is 
in part an attempt to bolster the idea that all parts of private law, including 
property law,7 can be grounded in commutative justice.8 In other writings, 
Beever has attempted to show that what Weinrib considered at the highest 
level of abstraction is in fact confirmed when one zooms in and examines 
legal doctrine (slightly) more closely. After dealing with negligence in an 
earlier book,9 Beever has now turned his attention to other torts. His book The 
Law of Private Nuisance10 should be understood as part of that latter effort. 
 
 3 Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012) contains essays extending 
the analysis to restitution and property rights. See especially at chs 4–6, 8. 
 4 See Allan Beever, ‘Formalism in Music and Law’ (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 
213, 213–14. This is not the place to comment on Beever’s thoughts on law and music beyond 
the remark that because of the vast differences between them analogies from one to the other 
can be taken almost anywhere one wishes. For two variations on the theme of law and music, 
different from each other and different from Beever’s, see Jerome Frank, ‘Say It with Music’ 
(1948) 61 Harvard Law Review 921; Gerald J Postema, ‘Melody and Law’s Mindfulness of 
Time’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 203. 
 5 Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart Publishing, 2007) 71. 
 6 Allan Beever, Forgotten Justice: The Forms of Justice in the History of Legal and Political Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 7 Ibid 146, 279–80. Beever’s and others’ efforts to show that commutative justice alone is 
sufficient to explain property rights have not met with much approval. See, eg, Peter Cane, 
‘Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
471, 475–6; Stephen A Smith, ‘The Rights of Private Law’ in Andrew Robertson and Tang 
Hang Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 113, 122–9; Dan Priel, 
‘Private Law: Commutative or Distributive?’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 308, 320–1. 
 8 Beever now prefers to speak of ‘commutative justice’ instead of ‘corrective justice’ to indicate 
that in his view this form of justice covers both ‘primary rights’ and ‘secondary rights’ of 
rectification. Although Weinrib has stuck to ‘corrective justice’, he has made it clear that his 
notion of corrective justice covers all of private law and extends beyond rectification: see 
Weinrib, Corrective Justice, above n 3, 335. 
 9 Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence, above n 5. 
 10 Allan Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
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I do not think that Weinrib’s research program has much to commend it 
and have found Beever’s earlier efforts to defend it largely unsuccessful.11 It is 
therefore perhaps unsurprising that I was similarly unpersuaded by his 
suggestions on how to ‘start again’ with the law of private nuisance.12 The rest 
of this essay seeks to explain why. I start by examining Beever’s methodology. 
Beever aligns himself with a popular approach to thinking about legal 
doctrine, according to which an adequate account of legal doctrine must be 
‘internal’ to the law. I argue that despite insisting on the importance of 
internal explanations, Beever is unclear about what he means by it. I consider 
one likely candidate for this internality — that the explanation fit legal 
doctrine — and show that Beever’s views are very different from legal doc-
trine. I then try to identify a possible different account of internality at play in 
Beever’s work, but argue that to the extent that one can tease out such an 
account from his works, it is so broad that all explanations of law could count 
as internal in that sense. I argue instead that on a plausible understanding of 
what counts as an internal explanation of law, Beever’s account is completely 
external. In Part II, I turn to consider the substance of Beever’s views. I argue 
that there are many difficulties with his views that render his position 
impossible to apply in practice. In Part III, I add that in any case his account is 
largely irrelevant to understanding or improving nuisance law today because 
Beever’s approach leads him to confine his discussion to the law of nuisance in 
isolation of its normative surroundings. I contend that these days it is impos-
sible to understand the role of nuisance law without taking into account the 
extensive normative framework surrounding it. Because Beever does not, he 
bases his account on unrealistic examples of nuisance cases, which are of very 
little relevance to the real world today. This leads me, in the final Part of the 
essay, to add some remarks on the role of legal academics. I suggest that one 
possible source of the problems in Beever’s account is that his conception of 
the university is more than a century out of date. Instead, I suggest legal 
academics try to model their work on the university of our times. 
 
 11 Priel, ‘Commutative or Distributive?’, above n 7; Dan Priel, ‘The Justice in Unjust Enrich-
ment’ (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 813, 823–37. 
 12 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 13. 
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II   B E E V E R’ S  ME T H O D O L O G I C A L  CO M M I T M E N T S 
Right at the outset of his book Beever says that in understanding the law ‘we 
are looking for an explanation of the law that takes seriously the law’s own 
demand that its decisions be justified and be justified in terms of the legal 
materials’.13 In saying this Beever is in line with many contemporary writers 
who have stressed that any valid explanation of the law must adopt the law’s 
‘self-understanding’ or its ‘internal point of view’.14 Despite their prevalence, 
such claims are more often asserted rather than explained and are often left 
obscure. What, for example, does it mean to take seriously an inanimate 
institution’s ‘own demand’? More prosaically, how are we to determine what 
makes a certain explanation internal and another external? Beever, for 
example, seems to think that ideas found in the work of Kant are immanent in 
the law, even though they are rarely mentioned in common law legal materi-
als; on the other hand, despite countless references to it in the cases, he thinks 
that policy is extrinsic to the law. What is his basis for these judgements? 
Part of the problem is that for the distinction between internal and exter-
nal explanations of law to make any sense it must be clear what an explanation 
should be internal to or external of. This is rarely clearly specified. As I will 
attempt to show, when we try to answer this question in relation to Beever’s 
book, his claims become difficult to sustain. Though this Part focuses on 
Beever’s work, I hope it will prove to be of broader significance. Precisely 
because of the centrality accorded to explaining the law from the internal 
point of view, and especially because Beever follows here in the footsteps of 
Weinrib’s very influential account, there is value in addressing this matter. For 
I believe the methodological problems I identify in Beever’s work are indica-
tive of broader problems with ‘internalist’ accounts of law.15 
 
 13 Ibid 5. 
 14 See, eg, Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, above n 2, 18; Stephen A Smith, ‘Taking Law 
Seriously’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 241, 250; John C P Goldberg and 
Benjamin C Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on 
Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1563, 1575 quoting H L A Hart, The Concept of 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 89. 
 15 For a critical discussion on the place of the internal point of view in law see Charles L 
Barzun, ‘Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship’ (2015) 
101 Virginia Law Review 1203. 
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A  What Makes an Explanation Internal? 
Though I will consider Beever’s views in detail later, at the moment it will 
suffice to present the essence of his account, which is that the law of nuisance 
is concerned with ‘the prioritising of property rights’.16 In a slightly longer 
formulation, Beever’s central argument is that ‘nuisance is concerned with 
prioritising property rights. A nuisance occurs when the defendant uses land 
in a way that interferes with the more fundamental use of the claimant’s. The 
issue is not whether the claimant is personally bothered by any of this’.17  
Beever begins the book by informing his readers that there is a view of 
private nuisance, he calls it ‘the conventional view’, that ‘the overwhelming 
majority of lawyers adhere generally to’.18 Despite its prevalence, Beever thinks 
it is a ‘collapsing building’ and whatever remains of it must be completely torn 
down. In its stead he suggests a new beginning ‘with new foundations’.19 Is this 
failed conventional explanation limited to commentators who do not under-
stand what they see in the cases? Not according to Beever. He summarises the 
conventional view as described in one textbook, and says: ‘The [textbook] 
author’s task is to depict the law as it is presented in the cases. The author 
succeeds. But what he succeeds in depicting is a failure’.20 With characteristic 
modesty21 Beever then proceeds to present an account that, apparently for the 
first time, will make sense of the law: ‘The problem is not that the law does the 
wrong thing. The problem is that it does not understand what it is doing’.22 
When translated to less mysterious language, what Beever claims is that the 
account he offers has escaped all lawyers, all commentators, and even all 
judges. Beever’s new beginning, then, aims to capture what the law actually is 
and to abide by the constraint that ‘the justification [of the law] must be in 
terms of the law itself, at least in the sense that the reasons that justify a 
 
 16 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 2. 
 17 Ibid 120. 
 18 Ibid 5. 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 Ibid 9 (emphasis added). 
 21 In an earlier book Beever assured his readers that ‘though the theory [advanced in the book] 
will of course require improvement — it would be surprising if the theory were on the wrong 
track. Instead, it must represent a leap forward in our understanding of the law’: Beever, 
Rediscovering the Law of Negligence, above n 5, 32. 
 22 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 9. 
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decision ought to be found in the judgment itself ’,23 despite the fact that the 
law on this matter does not understand itself. 
How is this to be done? Beever acknowledges that for his view to be inter-
nal to the law ‘what must be clear is that the principle [that the law of nui-
sance prioritises property rights so that more fundamental uses of land trump 
less fundamental uses] … must be reflected in the law somewhere’.24 And yet, 
Beever does not provide a single quotation from a single case to directly 
support his claims about what nuisance law is about. At most, Beever can 
claim that it explains the outcomes of the cases.25 Even here, however, the 
claim must be qualified. On the (many) occasions that his views do not match 
the outcomes of the cases, Beever has no hesitation in declaring those cases 
wrong and in arguing that existing doctrine should give way to his ideas. 
Beever’s account thus seeks to achieve the improbable feat of being internal 
to the law despite not being based on what is actually found in legal materials. 
It is worth comparing Beever’s approach to the one considered by many 
(Beever included)26 to be the epitome of ‘external’ theorising about law: 
economic analysis of law. When Richard Posner first argued that negligence 
law reflected economic rationality, he purportedly based his argument on 
what he found in dozens of late 19th century cases.27 And yet, this economic 
account was considered ‘external’ because it, at most, only fit the outcomes of 
the cases, but found relatively little support in the rationales or concepts 
found in those cases.28 Now Beever claims his account is internal to the law, 
despite the fact that his account suffers from the same problem. In fact, it is 
arguable that Beever’s account fares even worse. Legal economists have 
addressed the problem of the divergence between their proposed economic 
rationales and the language of the cases. Richard Posner, for example, has 
 
 23 Ibid 6. 
 24 Ibid 105–6. 
 25 See ibid 70. 
 26 See Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence, above n 5, 34. 
 27 Richard Posner’s views about the efficiency of the common law of negligence were based on 
his reading of all published American accident cases decided in the first quarter of 1875, 
1885, 1895, and 1905: Richard A Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’ (1972) 1 Journal of Legal 
Studies 29, 34. I should note, however, that Posner’s claim to have found support for his 
interpretation in the cases has been challenged. See Richard W Wright, ‘Hand, Posner, and 
the Myth of the “Hand Formula”’ (2003) 4 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 145. 
 28 See Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, above n 2, 16, 47–8; cf Stephen A Smith, Contract 
Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004) 132. 
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argued that for the explanatory value of economic analysis of law it is enough 
that we ‘assum[e] counter-factually’ that judges are concerned with maximis-
ing efficiency, so long as the economic arguments offer testable hypotheses 
that yield successful predictions of case outcomes.29 Others have suggested 
invisible hand arguments purporting to show how the common law can 
become more efficient over time even if judges do not aim at efficiency.30 
Whether or not these arguments are successful, legal economists acknowl-
edged and addressed the problem of the divergence between the content of 
legal cases and the economic explanation of those cases. Beever, by contrast, 
never considers the fact that his ideas are not reflected in judicial statements a 
reason for doubting that his account is found ‘in the law’. 
A further constraint for an argument claiming to be internal to the law is 
that it must present a refutable hypothesis, or else the claim to internality is 
nothing but an empty assertion. This could mean, for example, showing that 
most cases, or at least a strong current in the central cases, are in line with 
one’s view. When this is the case, a few recalcitrant cases can be dismissed as 
‘outliers’, as ‘wrongly decided’, as ‘inconsistent with the weight of authority’ or 
with the ‘underlying principle behind the cases’. By the same token, when this 
is not shown, when the reader is given no assurance that the few cases 
discussed reflect the dominant view in the courts, then the discussion of a 
small number of cases can at best serve as garnish. If a case relied upon to 
demonstrate a point is not in fact representative of the general drift of the law, 
then it is only valuable for the persuasive power of its content, not for its 
evidentiary value in reflecting ‘the law’. In these circumstances discussing the 
case does not add anything to the force of the argument, which must be 
shown to have merit on its own. One may, of course, rely on arguments found 
in cases just as one may rely on arguments taken from any other source, but 
such references cannot then be used to show that the view presented is 
‘internal’ to the law. 
 
 29 See Richard A Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (Clarendon Press, 
1996) 60. This aligns Posner closely with Milton Friedman’s view: Milton Friedman, Essays in 
Positive Economics (University of Chicago Press, 1953) 3–43. 
 30 For a survey of this literature see Paul H Rubin, ‘Why Was the Common Law Efficient?’ in 
Francesco Parisi and Charles K Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by 
the Founding Fathers (Edward Elgar, 2005) 383, 384–8. Rubin admits: ‘It is fair to say that the 
models failed …’: at 384. 
354 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 39:346 
 
In addition to the number of cases supporting a view, another important 
factor for showing that one’s argument is internal to the law is their age. As the 
number of cases cited in Beever’s book is fairly small, it was not difficult to 
calculate their average age. In 2013, the book’s year of publication, it was 72 
years (the median is somewhat lower, but at 59.5 is still very high).31 To make 
things worse, not only does Beever cite predominantly older cases, but 
generally speaking, the younger the case is, the less likely it is that Beever will 
think it right.32 This might have been less of a concern if Beever thought that 
nuisance had some eternal, unchanging nature, but at least judging by this 
book, he does not. In response to a claim about the nature of nuisance made 
on the basis of historical cases, Beever replies: 
The claim that, historically, a nuisance had to be continuous is well made. 
But the conclusion that continuation belongs to the ‘essential nature’ of the tort 
does not follow from it. This argument commits a genetic fallacy. … Legal his-
tory is of great importance, but the nature of our modern actions is not 
chained to it.33 
If that is the case, if Beever is after the nature of ‘our modern actions’, then a 
book that focuses on the case law as it stood three generations ago is prima 
facie useless, for we have no way of knowing to what extent the law remained 
the same in the years since. 
This is not merely an ‘academic’ concern. The last 70 years have seen sig-
nificant changes to the relevant law. In the period in question the relationship 
between private and public law has dramatically changed with the advent of 
the regulatory state. As a result, environmental law, an area of law that barely 
existed 70 years ago, is now a major part of the law, and one that addresses 
many of the problems previously governed by nuisance law. Even Beever 
 
 31 The statistics for the age of cases by country, derived from Beever, The Law of Private 
Nuisance, above n 10, xi–xiv, are as follows. Australia: average 45, median 34.5; Canada: 
average 50, median 31.5; New Zealand: average 39, median 38; United Kingdom: average 76, 
median 63; United States: average 107, median 105. 
 32 Examples of his disagreement with recent cases are found in ibid 76–9, 105, 124 n 30, 134–6, 
143–4, 148–9. 
 33 Ibid 40 (emphasis added). Elsewhere Beever argues that the task of the academic lawyer ‘is to 
illuminate the law’s fundamental and enduring structure’: Allan Beever and Charles Rickett, 
‘Interpretive Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 320, 329 
(emphasis added). That assumes that the law has such an enduring structure, which is hard to 
reconcile with the position quoted in the text. 
2015] Land Use Priorities and the Law of Nuisance 355 
 
admits that ‘the social importance of the law of private nuisance has shrunk’34 
in recent years, because of the dominance of regulation; and yet he confines 
himself purely to private nuisance.35 He thus completely ignores the possibil-
ity that the changed normative landscape surrounding the tort of nuisance has 
changed nuisance law as well. I will return to this point below. 
In addition to volume and age, a third important consideration for show-
ing that an account is adequately internal to the law is the accuracy in the 
description of the cases discussed. Beever seeks to show that the cases reflect a 
philosophy that is very different from the one currently accepted by most 
commentators. To that end he discusses a few cases arguing that they reflect 
a rights-based, non-instrumental conception of nuisance liability. The 
problem is that his presentation of these cases is often unreliable.36 Consider, 
for example, the way Beever discusses the well-known American case of 
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp v Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc (‘Fontainebleau’).37 This 
case involved a dispute between two adjacent hotels on Miami Beach. The 
owners of the Fontainebleau hotel sought to build additional floors to it; the 
owners of the Eden Roc worried that this would put their hotel’s swimming 
pool in the shade for much of the day. The latter sued in nuisance, but failed. 
To show us that the courts favour rights-based, and reject policy-based, 
arguments, Beever quotes from the case as follows: 
This is indeed a novel application of the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas. This maxim does not mean that one must never use his own property in 
such a way as to do any injury to his neighbour … It means only that one must 
use his property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another …38 
 
 34 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 1. 
 35 Ibid 4. 
 36 This is not the first time I have found this. For extensive documentation see Priel, ‘Commuta-
tive or Distributive?’, above n 7. See especially the appendix to the online version of the 
essay, Dan Priel, ‘Private Law: Commutative or Distributive’, (Osgoode CLPE Research Paper 
No 56/2013, 26 November 2013) 34–64 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318587>. 
 37 114 So 2d 357 (Fla Ct App, 1959). I would be remiss if I did not mention that Beever 
discusses in his book exactly four American cases (the most recent of which is from 1959), all 
of them apparently taken from a Canadian student casebook edited by Weinrib: Ernest J 
Weinrib, Tort Law: Cases and Materials (Emond Montgomery, 4th ed, 2014) 4, 7, 11, 126. The 
same cases are found in earlier editions of this book. 
 38 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 49, quoting Fontainebleau 114 So 2d 357, 
359 (Fla Ct App, 1959). 
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Based on this Beever declares triumphantly that ‘the law of nuisance is 
concerned with the parties’ property rights’ and that the court rejects the view 
that ‘causing the claimant significant economic loss’ amounts to a nuisance.39 
(Who ever thought that?) Positively, Beever declares, the court decided that 
there is no right to sunlight. 
The problem with this claim is that showing that courts employ the lan-
guage of rights does not show that they endorse Beever’s rights-based view of 
tort law. Courts can use the language of rights as conclusions of arguments 
that are themselves wholly based on policy. That this is what the courts in fact 
do is not a novel idea. It was suggested already in the late 19th century by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. The particular example Holmes used to illustrate this 
point is striking for its relevance for our discussion: 
whether, and how far, a privilege [ie, right] shall be allowed is a question of pol-
icy. … Therefore, decisions for or against the privilege, which really can stand 
only upon such grounds, often are presented as hollow deductions from empty 
general propositions like sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which teaches 
nothing but a benevolent yearning …40 
These hollow deductions, said Holmes, are then put forward 
as if they themselves embodied a postulate of the law and admitted of no fur-
ther deduction, as when it is said that, although there is temporal damage, there 
is no wrong; whereas, the very thing to be found out is whether there is a wrong 
or not, and if not, why not.41 
On the view Beever advances, it is pure reflection on the nature of proper-
ty that reveals its contours and scope; it is on the basis of such reflection that 
he concludes that individuals do not have a right to sunlight. This is one of the 
reasons he thinks policy has no place within private law.42 Therefore, to show 
that courts adopt his view, Beever needs to show that when courts talk of 
rights they do the same. A second aspect of his view is that these rights are 
‘trumps’ over social utility. The two points are obviously related: if courts are 
to ignore considerations of social utility (‘policy’), they will not be able to 
 
 39 Ibid 49. 
 40 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, ‘Privilege, Malice, and Intent’ (1894) 8 Harvard Law Review 1, 3. 
 41 Ibid. See also O W Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 466–7. 
 42 See Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence, above n 5, 513: ‘the standard of care should 
be set to achieve justice between the parties’. 
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know the social implications of their decisions and whether protecting ‘rights’ 
will hamper social welfare. In the alternative picture presented by Holmes, the 
scope of rights is determined by changing social needs and circumstances, 
and therefore judges do (and should) look into ‘policy’. Which of these 
possibilities is better reflected in Fontainebleau? Here is what the Court says:  
There being, then, no legal right to the free flow of light and air from the ad-
joining land, it is universally held that where a structure serves a useful and 
beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of action, either for damages 
or for an injunction under the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, even 
though it causes injury to another by cutting off the light and air and interfering 
with the view that would otherwise be available over adjoining land in its natu-
ral state, regardless of the fact that the structure may have been erected partly 
for spite.43 
The Court clearly repudiates the second of Beever’s contentions. Rights are 
not trumps over utility, they are subject to it: there is no cause of action ‘where 
a structure serves a useful … purpose’. What about the first one, the determi-
nation of the content of the right? In support of the interpersonal, a priori, 
reading, Beever quotes again from the case: ‘No American decision has been 
cited, and independent research has revealed none, in which it has been held 
that … a landowner has a legal right to the free flow of light and air across the 
adjoining land of his neighbor’.44 What Beever omits is what comes shortly 
afterwards: ‘the English doctrine of “ancient lights” has been unanimously 
repudiated in this country’.45 So the case does not stand for the proposition 
that there is an a priori, universal prioritisation of land uses. It stands for a 
local idea, one that in England (whose case law Beever otherwise focuses on) 
might have been decided differently. Since Beever claims that his task is not 
that of a ‘journalis[t]’46 who merely reports what the courts say but provides 
an explanation, one is entitled to ask: why did American and English courts 
 
 43 Fontainebleau, 114 So 2d 357, 359 (Fla Ct App, 1959). 
 44 Ibid quoted in Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 49–50. 
 45 Ibid. Incidentally, a report of a 1569 case on the doctrine of ancient lights shows the parties 
relied on wide-ranging social considerations and did not confine themselves to the interper-
sonal relations between parties:. See ‘Hales’s Case (1569)’, in Sir John Baker, Baker and Mil-
som Sources of English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 
2010) 652. 
 46 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 2. 
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reach different conclusions on this matter? One possible answer might be that 
the different views reflect the fact that sunlight is a much scarcer commodity 
in England than in Florida (and perhaps most of the United States); or that 
the different needs for development, or social attitudes toward it, may have 
been reflected in different rules about the right to sunlight. That, of course, is 
not the answer Beever would want to hear. This answer suggests that the 
determination of what rights we have depends, at least in part, on contingent, 
local factors that do not relate exclusively to the relationship between the two 
parties, and which can only be ascertained by empirical investigation. 
Interestingly, though the Court in Fontainebleau stated that it could not 
find any American cases that found a right to light, there are later cases that 
have affirmed exactly such a right, in part on the basis of its beneficial social 
value as an alternative source of energy.47 And once such environmental 
considerations (the amount of available sunlight, the population density, the 
value attached to property development, the perceived value of sustainable 
energy) are deemed relevant to the determination of the existence and 
contents of rights, it is hard to see a principled reason for excluding any other 
considerations about the consequences of the decision. To do this is, of 
course, to reintroduce the scourge of ‘policy’ that Beever so detests back into 
private law. To avert this problem, in Beever’s version of Fontainebleau, these 
aspects of the decision are silently ignored. 
Here is another example of the difference between what appears in a case 
and the way Beever presents it. Beever discusses Bramwell B’s famous decision 
in Bamford v Turnley (‘Bamford’),48 a case involving a neighbour dispute 
between a doctor and a confectioner. Beever quotes an excerpt from the 
decision, and then says ‘[t]he reference to convenience, advantage and the like 
 
 47 See, eg, Prah v Maretti, 321 NW 2d 182, 190 (Abrahamson J) (Wis SC, 1982), where the 
Court states:  
Courts should not implement obsolete policies that have lost their vigor over the course 
of the years. The law of private nuisance is better suited to resolve landowners’ disputes 
about property development in the 1980’s than is a rigid rule which does not recognize a 
landowner’s interest in access to sunlight. 
  Cf Ough v King [1967] 1 WLR 1547, 1552–3 (Lord Denning MR). While the determination is 
dependent on the particular facts and normative situation in different US states — see, eg, 
Sher v Leiderman, 226 Cal App 3d 867 (Ct App, 1986) and Collinson v John L Scott Inc, 778 P 
2d 534 (Wash Ct App, 1989), for decisions going the other way — there is never a suggestion 
the difference in outcomes is the product of abstract prioritisations of different land uses. 
 48 (1862) 3 B & S 66; 122 ER 27. 
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has led many to the conclusion that Bramwell B was thinking of utilitarian 
concerns. Perhaps he was. But, in fact, Bramwell B’s appeal is to fairness 
between the parties’.49 This may sound convincing to anyone who only reads 
the small portion of the decision that Beever quotes. But there is a reason why 
many have argued that Bramwell B’s decision in Bamford reflects utilitarian 
reasoning. It is the following passage, which appears on the very same page 
from which Beever quoted: 
The public consists of all the individuals of it, and a thing is only for the public 
benefit when it is productive of good to those individuals on the balance of loss 
and gain to all. So that if all the loss and all the gain were borne and received by 
one individual, he on the whole would be a gainer. But whenever this is the 
case, — whenever a thing is for the public benefit, properly understood, — the 
loss to the individuals of the public who lose will bear compensation out of the 
gains of those who gain. It is for the public benefit there should be railways, but 
it would not be unless the gain of having the railway was sufficient to compen-
sate the loss occasioned by the use of the land required for its site; and accord-
ingly no one thinks it would be right to take an individual’s land without com-
pensation to make a railway. It is for the public benefit that trains should run, 
but not unless they pay their expences [sic].50 
Bramwell B then states that he considers the law to be ‘defective’ if in the 
case of a loss that could be fully compensated, the plaintiff could insist on an 
injunction which ‘might put a stop to works of great value, and much more 
than enough to compensate him’.51 As several commentators have noted,52 
Bramwell B offers here the basic ingredients of an economic analysis of 
nuisance, but you will never know this if you read Beever’s book. 
 
 49 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 29. 
 50 Bamford (1862) 3 B & S 66, 84–5; 122 ER 27, 33. As is well known, Bramwell B did not 
keep his views on politics and economics secret, even during his tenure as a judge: see 
M W Taylor, ‘Bramwell, George William Wilshere, Baron Bramwell (1808–1892)’ in Brian 
Harrison (ed), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004) vol 7. 
 51 Bamford (1862) 3 B & S 66, 85–6; 122 ER 27, 33. That is precisely the opposite of Beever’s 
approach. 
 52 P S Atiyah, ‘Liability for Railway Nuisance in the English Common Law: A Historical 
Footnote’ (1980) 23 Journal of Law and Economics 191; Richard A Epstein, ‘For a Bramwell 
Revival’ (1994) 38 American Journal of Legal History 246, 276–7; Cento G Veljanovski, Eco-
nomic Principles of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 78. 
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B  The Externality of Beever’s Approach 
I could provide additional illustrations of the difference between the way 
Beever describes cases and what is found in them, but I believe the point is 
clear. How can Beever still claim that his alternative to the ‘conventional view’ 
really reflects ‘the law’s approach’? Though he does not provide an answer to 
the question in the book, in a recent article Beever has suggested that in 
addition to positive law, there is something else, natural law or higher law. The 
declaratory theory of law according to which judges find the law and not 
make it, he says, refers to this natural law, not the positive law.53 Positing the 
existence of this law can solve other problems for Beever. That judicial 
opinions offer conflicting explanations in no way shows that the law is a 
mess.54 All one needs to do is assert the existence of natural law, and one can 
then be assured that that law ‘is well ordered and undergoes at least relatively 
little change’.55 In similar fashion, the view he favours can be seen as internal 
to natural law, even if it differs from positive law. 
Beever’s view is thus completely independent of, and completely external 
to, the law as found in legal materials. This is not a speculation. In an earlier 
essay, ironically an essay dedicated to vindicating the internalist credentials of 
his approach, Beever was quite explicit about this:  
it is a fact about the world, not merely about the law, that an event is a consent, 
a wrong, an unjust enrichment, or an ‘other event’. Accordingly … [this] divi-
sion of the law is premised on distinctions that cannot — cannot as a matter of 
logic — be disproved by legal history. Again, and not surprisingly, this is widely 
recognised in disciplines outside law. Political history does not determine the 
truth about theoretical understandings of politics, nor, in our view, can or does 
legal history determine the truth about legal categories.56  
If the true categories of law are a matter of fact about the world that cannot 
be disproved by legal history, they similarly cannot be disproved by present-
day legal doctrine. They are not human creations and their existence is 
completely outside of human institutions. This is the approach of an out-and-
 
 53 Allan Beever, ‘The Declaratory Theory of Law’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
421, 425. 
 54 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 2–3. 
 55 Beever, ‘Formalism in Music and Law’, above n 4, 229 (emphasis in original). 
 56 Beever and Rickett, above n 33, 330 (emphasis added). 
2015] Land Use Priorities and the Law of Nuisance 361 
 
out rationalist, someone who thinks that moral philosophy is largely an 
exercise in a priori reflection, and that these exercises in pure practical reason 
reveal the content of natural law. Beever combines this belief with the 
normative demand that courts adopt this natural law as positive law. As he put 
it: ‘Fulfilling the law is a matter of making the positive law more accurately 
reflect [the] abstract and enduring law’.57 This is as clear a statement as one 
could find that Beever is a pure externalist about law. He thinks lawyers and 
philosophers should aim to discover the content of the ‘abstract and enduring 
law’, whose content remains (roughly) the same across time and place. 
The only way this approach could be deemed as internal to the law is by 
having a view of what the law should be, calling it ‘natural law’, declaring that 
it exists, and then proclaiming that one’s desired approach is internal to that 
law. Since the content of natural law is entirely unspecified, this view renders 
Beever’s claims to the internality of his own account completely immune to 
refutation. But by that standard even a proponent of the economic approach 
could call his ideal for what the law should be ‘natural law’ thereby rendering 
his own account ‘internal’. After all, there were those who treated the funda-
mentals of classical economics as laws of nature.58 
To claim that one’s favoured approach is ‘internal’ to natural law thus adds 
nothing to one’s argument. It is a rhetorical device that enables one to turn 
what one thinks ought to be the case into what is the case. Beever employs 
something like this technique in his discussion of Rogers v Elliott.59 To 
Beever’s chagrin, the case considered various policy considerations in support 
of its conclusions. Beever acknowledges this fact; he even says that the policy 
arguments found in the case are a ‘familiar type’ of policy argument found in 
many other cases.60 He then goes on to offer an alternative explanation, one 
not found in the case and which purportedly does not rely on policy. Based on 
this explanation he then declares: ‘we see that the law’s approach to the 
sensitivity of the claimant is not to be understood as some policy-based 
 
 57 Beever, ‘The Declaratory Theory of Law’, above n 53, 429. 
 58 See, eg, Henry Wood, The Political Economy of Natural Law (Lee and Shepard Publishers, 
1894). For explorations of the history of these ideas see O H Taylor, ‘Economics and the Idea 
of Natural Laws’ (1929) 44 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1, see especially at 25–7; cf Alfred 
F Chalk, ‘Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism in England’ (1951) 59 Journal 
of Political Economy 332. 
 59 15 NE 768 (Mass, 1888). 
 60 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 34. 
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exception to a general approach. On the contrary, it is mandated by a proper 
understanding of that approach’.61 Now, if talking about the law as found in 
the cases, then the fact that this and hundreds of others cases make reference 
to policy, renders Beever’s claim absurd. If we designate what we wish the law 
to be ‘natural law’, then anything can reflect this ‘law’s approach’. 
In other words, there is a price to pay for this line of argument. If it is the 
natural law that Beever is trying to explicate, then there is no room for citing 
and discussing cases in the way he does. For the legal materials that make up 
positive law are external to natural law (and vice versa). Beever would have to 
admit that his account is not based on what the law is — that it is external to 
legal materials — but that it represents what he thinks the law should be. 
What Beever does instead is to rely selectively on legal materials. When 
Beever finds aspects of legal decisions that fit his view of what the law should 
be, he quotes them as evidence that his approach really is reflected in the law. 
When the decisions do not fit his approach, he dismisses decisions as ‘unac-
ceptable’ because they are ‘not a legal analysis’,62 or by saying that ‘the basis of 
liability in the tort [of nuisance] … has been so misunderstood’ by the 
‘conventional’ view accepted by courts.63 In short, heads, I win; tails, you lose. 
There is not just a methodological flaw in Beever’s approach, but a more 
fundamental, philosophical, one. Even assuming natural law exists as Beever 
imagines it, and assuming further that it is knowable (a matter on which we 
must simply take Beever on faith, as he provides no argument to support it), 
and assuming also that Beever got the content of natural law exactly right, it 
remains to be shown that judges explicating positive law are trying to match 
this natural law. And while such questions are not easy to answer, we have 
many reasons to believe that the answer to this question is negative. For one, 
Beever himself says so. It is his claim that all judges, lawyers and commenta-
tors have misunderstood that law. One way of interpreting this claim is that all 
judges have been trying to identify natural law but somehow failing miserably. 
A far more plausible explanation is that lawyers are not trying to match the 
law to some abstract entity that exists outside of time and space, but rather 
 
 61 Ibid 37 (emphasis added). 
 62 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 144. The object of this charge is La Forest J’s 
opinion in Tock v St John’s Metropolitan Area Board [1989] 2 SCR 1181, 1200–1. As it happens 
the Supreme Court of Canada has recently unanimously endorsed it in Antrim Truck Centre 
Ltd v Ontario (Transportation) [2013] 1 SCR 594, 614 [38]–[39] (Cromwell J for the Court). 
 63 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 69. 
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have been trying to craft solutions to changing problems based on the 
changing values of their day. 
This reveals Beever’s blindness to a significant theoretical strand within 
common law thinking. Beever recently wrote that ‘[w]hen asked a difficult 
legal question, the common lawyer, if she is a modern, thinks either of cases 
or statutes and, if she is a traditionalist, ponders principles and ideas’.64 While 
his labels are misleading (what Beever calls the ‘traditional’ view has never 
been a dominant view in common law thinking), what he calls the ‘modern’ 
approach reflects a powerful strand within the philosophy of the common 
law.65 Nowhere is this point clearer than when Beever says that ‘there is no 
doubt that historical explanations are enlightening … [but] they cannot 
provide justification’.66 For if there is one central idea to much common law 
thinking it is precisely that history, not pure reason, is a form of justification. 
Such statements reveal how little understanding (or little regard) Beever 
has for the common law as a theory of authority. This view posits a construc-
tive methodology in which the answers to legal questions are slowly constitut-
ed in a piecemeal fashion, not in a manner that seeks to discover some eternal 
principles that are external to the law, but by an identification of the slowly-
changing principles that are embedded in the practice. Within this view 
history is the basis for the law’s authority and its justification.67 It is a view that 
 
 64 Beever, Forgotten Justice, above n 6, 206. 
 65 I should stress that this is by no means the only philosophical approach underlying the 
common law. See Dan Priel, ‘Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common 
Law Divide’ (unpublished manuscript); Dan Priel, ‘Philosophies of the Common Law and 
their Implications’ in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of 
Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2015). 
 66 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 6. 
 67 Contrast Beever’s claim — that ‘[h]istory is important, but it is not justification’: ibid 95 — 
with Pocock’s description of Burke’s understanding of the common law: ‘Rights are not 
justified by abstract reason, but as an inheritance under positive laws’: J G A Pocock, ‘Burke 
and the Ancient Constitution — A Problem in the History of Ideas’ (1960) 3 Historical Jour-
nal 125, 128. Of course, Burke’s view is not necessarily correct, but in fact it has deep 
roots in common law thinking: at 129–30. See also David Lieberman, The Province of Legisla-
tion Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 40–5; A W B Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law 
(Hambledon Press, 1987) 373–5. 
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emphasises the normative force of the particular historical path that the law 
has taken in identifying right answers to legal questions.68 
It is because Beever does not understand (or, more charitably, rejects with-
out argument) this historicist theory of authority, that he dismisses the work 
of academics who expound what is found in the cases as ‘a form of journal-
ism: a reporting of what has been expounded elsewhere’.69 Within the 
common law theory of authority, this ‘journalistic’ explication of the cases is 
how legal truths, normativity, and criticism are made possible — not as an 
attempt to match some abstract higher law, but as the careful working out from 
the myriad of cases, of the general principles that are implicit in them. 
One may, of course, reject this entire approach and its underlying theory of 
authority (for the record, I have serious doubts about it); but then one should 
admit that the right approach to finding what the law should be bears no 
relation to (is external of) what the law is, and that whatever similarities are 
found between one’s desired approach and what is found in the law are 
nothing more than happy coincidences. That is Beever’s actual view. Court 
decisions as such have absolutely no authority in his account. They have merit 
for him if, and only if, they fit his views about what the law should be, views 
he arrived at completely independently of those decisions. To put it more 
strongly, even if the highest courts all over the common law world were to 
declare unequivocally that they rejected Beever’s views on nuisance, there is 
little doubt that in itself that would in no way lead Beever to change his mind 
about the nature of nuisance law. 
There is one exception to Beever’s generally dismissive view of the courts’ 
work. Recall that in his view the law of nuisance is not really concerned with 
what laypeople would call a ‘nuisance’, but with the determination of land use 
priorities. Beever thinks the determination of these priorities is often so 
obvious that it does not require argument, but he admits that on closer calls 
judges will have to rely on ‘judgement’.70 It is on this matter, and seemingly 
 
 68 Beever claims that many features of the common law, for example the claim that the law is 
discovered, that cases are ‘wrongly decided’ and others, can only be explained if we assume 
the existence of this other kind of law. This is a mistake, which is the result of his failure to 
consider history as a source of authority. I consider the difference between the philosophy 
underlying Beever’s thinking and that found in the common law in more detail in Priel, 
‘Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide’, above n 65. 
 69 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 2. 
 70 Ibid 45–8. 
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this matter alone, that ‘past cases are a record of the judgements made by 
judges over the law’s history’.71 But the appeal to courts here looks rather odd. 
After all, the book is premised on the view that the courts’ entire approach to 
the law of nuisance has been a ‘failure’; what basis do we have, then, for 
trusting their ‘judgement’? Furthermore, even if we tried, it is unclear what it 
is that we could rely on. Despite the fact that in one form or another the tort 
of nuisance has been around for hundreds of years, courts have never gotten 
around to offering even a tentative list of land use priorities which we could 
use as a guide. (If they did, presumably Beever would have reproduced it for 
us.) So on what must be the most practically significant aspect of this view of 
the law of nuisance, Beever’s book is silent. 
III   E VA LUAT I N G  BE E V E R’ S  VI E WS  O N  T H E I R  OW N 
As already mentioned, I do not see any fault in adopting a completely external 
account of what the law should be. However, when one adopts this approach, 
the weight on the argument is on its persuasive power. An external account 
thus forces its proponent to show that their proposals are normatively 
superior to others. The aim of this Part is to show that Beever’s approach fails 
this test. Some of the difficulties I point out are limited to the particulars of 
Beever’s account, but I believe others are illustrations of more fundamental 
problems with the idea that a priori moral reflection should be the basis for 
legal rules. Plainly, this broader issue is beyond the scope of this essay, but I 
hope some of my remarks will help cast doubt on this approach to thinking 
about the law. 
Though Beever’s official view is that ‘[t]he law of nuisance … prioritise[s] 
property rights … by insisting that the exercise of more fundamental rights 
trumps the exercise of less fundamental rights’,72 his concrete examples all 
talk about the prioritisation of land uses. At times Beever slides within a single 
sentence from one formulation to the other: ‘The law of nuisance prioritises 
property rights so that more fundamental uses of land trump less fundamen-
tal uses’.73 The two, however, are quite different. 
 
 71 Ibid 48. 
 72 Ibid 125 (emphasis added). 
 73 Ibid 105. 
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If there is one thing Beever does not discuss in his book, it is priority 
among property rights. He never discusses the question of whether there is 
any priority among ownership, leasehold, mortgage, easement (and other 
property rights) and its potential relevance for nuisance law. Quite the 
contrary: Beever says that legal occupiers of property should be entitled to sue 
in nuisance, even if they do not have property rights in them,74 and it seems 
he would not give a bank that has a mortgage the right to sue in nuisance, 
even though a mortgage is a property right.75 This implies that, contrary to 
Beever’s ‘official’ story, property rights (and their priority) are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for nuisance. What he does discuss is priority between uses 
of property. To accommodate the two views one has to hold that different 
property rights are involved in reading, sleeping, playing music, cooking, 
playing video games, manufacturing computers, providing legal services, and 
the endless number of other things people do in properties they occupy. 
If we focus on land uses instead of property rights, Beever’s view seems to 
be that if a certain land use is deemed more fundamental than another 
and the less fundamental interferes with the more fundamental one, then 
the former must stop, regardless of considerations like economic costs. In 
the remainder of this Part, I attempt to show there are serious difficulties with 
this suggestion. 
A  Describing the Relevant Activity 
Beever admits that the same activity can be described in different ways76 and 
that therefore ‘the appropriate description … is the one that most accurately 
captures their dispute’.77 He never explains what that means or gives any hints 
as to how we are to identify a description as more or less accurate. The result 
is a thoroughly unstable and very easily manipulable test. Consider the case of 
Christie v Davey (‘Christie’),78 which Beever discusses. The plaintiffs in this 
case gave music lessons in their home. The defendant was a disgruntled 
neighbour who disliked the playing emanating from his neighbour’s home 
 
 74 Ibid 124. 
 75 Cf ibid 125. 
 76 Ibid 43. 
 77 Ibid 45. 
 78 [1893] 1 Ch 316. 
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and reacted to it by ‘knocking on the party-wall, beating on trays, whistling, 
shrieking, and imitating what was being played in the Plaintiff ’s house’.79 The 
Court accepted the plaintiffs’ claim that this amounted to a nuisance and 
enjoined the neighbour from continuing with these behaviours.80 The 
‘conventional view’ according to Beever is that ‘because the defendant was 
motivated by malice, his activity was illegal’.81 It is not. The conventional 
explanation of the case is what the Court actually says: ‘the noises which were 
made in the Defendant’s house were not of a legitimate kind. They were what, 
to use the language of Lord Selborne in Gaunt v Fynney, “ought to be regarded 
as excessive and unreasonable”’.82  
Unreasonable interference with the plaintiff ’s enjoyment of their property 
does not fit Beever’s account, who insists that nuisance is a strict liability tort, 
so he ignores this statement.83 His alternative explanation is that the plaintiffs 
were successful because their land use was more fundamental: ‘The claimants’ 
activity was playing music. The defendant’s activity was banging on the walls 
etc in order to disrupt the claimants’ playing music. It must be clear that the 
former is more fundamental than the latter’.84 It is not clear to me. First, the 
defendant claimed that his sounds accorded with his musical taste.85 He was 
only half serious; but what if he had been an avant-garde musician? Beever 
insists elsewhere in the book that he does not judge music by its style, that for 
the purposes of his prioritisation view Rachmaninoff is as good as rap.86 If 
that is the case, then Schubert must be as good as Stockhausen, in which case 
the defendant’s noises would count as music (and as such as a more funda-
 
 79 Ibid 318 (North J). 
 80 Ibid 328. 
 81 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 53. 
 82 Christie [1893] 1 Ch 316, 326 (North J). Incidentally, malice is not problematic per se, but it is 
epistemically significant, for malice suggests that an activity is welfare-reducing. It is also 
often a mark for a unilateral action instead of conciliatory peaceful negotiation, which courts 
try to discourage. When there is reason to believe the ‘malicious’ activity is nevertheless 
socially useful, malice will not block the activity. Cf Michael Taggart, Private Property and 
Abuse of Rights in Victorian England: The Story of Edward Pickles and the Bradford Water 
Supply (Oxford University Press, 2002) 72–3. Something like this view is also expressed in 
Fontainebleau, 114 So 2d 357, 359 (Fla Ct App, 1959). 
 83 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 83–4. 
 84 Ibid 54. 
 85 Christie [1893] 1 Ch 316, 319 (North J). 
 86 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 31. 
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mental land use) based on his internal attitudes towards the activity. By 
contrast, elsewhere in the book Beever thinks that a plaintiff ’s sensitivity 
should be ignored and that the existence of a nuisance must be assessed by an 
‘objective approach’.87 Beever does not explain why the plaintiff ’s subjective 
sensitivity should be ignored but the defendant’s subjective definition of their 
land use should be decisive. 
More importantly, here is another description of both parties’ activities: 
they were both using their homes for running small businesses. The second-
named plaintiff was in the music instruction business, as she admitted when 
she wrote in her first communication with the defendant that his noises 
caused her ‘pecuniary loss’.88 And so was the defendant, who maintained that 
the music playing interfered with his wood-engraving business which 
required ‘great thought and the most delicate treatment’.89 Thus, it is not true 
that the plaintiffs were engaged in ‘playing music’, as Beever describes the 
case; nor is it plausible to suggest that the most appropriate description of 
what the defendant was doing was banging on walls. They both used their 
homes for a profit-making activity. And if these two profit-making activities 
(both artistic, as it happens) are not deemed equal enough, there is another 
activity that the defendant used his house for: he occupied it as his home. The 
defendant reported on his difficulty in ‘read[ing] a book or convers[ing] with 
friends’, and probably also of trouble with going to sleep (‘this atrocious 
hubbub drowns all efforts to hear, and is continued on to midnight and after, 
and often commences a little after 8am’).90 Beever says at one point that ‘being 
able to live on one’s land — and in particular being able to sleep at night on 
it — is more fundamental than running an oil depot’.91 He also adds that it 
 
 87 Ibid 35. Beever says that the objective test for sensitivity is the nuisance equivalent of 
Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468; 132 ER 490. But the thin skull rule is part of 
negligence, and this rule is inconsistent with this reading. Beever would abolish this rule in 
the name of coherence: Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence, above n 5, 162–6. He 
seems not to notice that doing that would require limiting full compensation to rich plaintiffs 
to the level of the average plaintiff. Being rich (and so having very high lost wages due to the 
injury) is no different from being more susceptible to serious injury (and so suffering greater 
losses upon injury). Both are pre-existing conditions that are equally (un)foreseeable. 
 88 Christie [1893] 1 Ch 316, 318 (North J). 
 89 Ibid 320. 
 90 Ibid. The Court was not entirely convinced by these factual claims, which may be why the 
case was decided the way it was: at 327–8. 
 91 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 26. 
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‘must be clear’ that ‘the use of … machinery’ is less fundamental than ‘the 
normal occupation of a room’.92 If that is the case, then the normal occupation 
of a home, one’s ability to live and sleep in one’s property, must be more 
fundamental than any business, whether it is giving music lessons or running 
an oil depot. (If rap and Rachmaninoff are to be treated as equal, presumably 
the same must be true of all businesses. If not, then Beever would have to 
provide us not only with a prioritisation of land uses, but also with a ranking 
of businesses.) Beever gets sidetracked by the fact that the defendant reacted 
to the interference from his neighbours by shrieks and whistles. But he could 
always stop, thus moving him up the ladder of land use priorities. (He 
certainly would have done that if he had had any reason to think that the land 
use priority view reflected the law.) Thus, an odd implication of Beever’s view 
is that a change in the defendant’s activity could immediately change the 
plaintiff ’s activity from a non-nuisance into a nuisance, even though that 
activity has not changed one bit. In fact, if we were to follow Beever’s reason-
ing that is precisely what happened the second the defendant complied with 
the Court’s injunction. At that moment, his land use changed from ‘banging 
on walls’ to ‘normal occupation’, at which moment he could enjoin his 
neighbours from engaging in the lower-ranked activity of running a business 
that interfered with his higher-ranked activity. 
This example illustrates a larger issue, which is that throughout the book 
Beever constantly shifts between broad descriptions (being able to live on 
one’s land, normal occupation of a room) and very narrow descriptions 
(sunbathing, banging on walls) of land uses. Part of the problem with the 
possibility of describing the same activity in different ways is that what counts 
as an activity to be prioritised depends on an account of an individuation of 
activities, one that is crucial for Beever’s view, but which he never provides. If 
one individuates the different activities to be prioritised very broadly, then 
Beever’s account is bound to lead to implausible outcomes. It is also bound to 
lead to many irresolvable ties between land uses of equal priority: a steel 
factory and a watchmaker are both businesses; as are two land owners, one 
shooting rabbits to sell their meat, another raising foxes for their fur. If land 
uses are individuated narrowly, such that, say, a particular factory in a 
particular place is deemed a different activity than the same factory in a 
different location, then Beever’s approach can only be understood as a more 
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cumbersome way of getting to what the courts have been doing all along: an 
assessment of the reasonableness of respective activities based on a host of 
considerations (locale, intensity of environment, the seriousness of the 
nuisance, and so on), including, of course, the relative value of the competing 
activities. What makes no sense, but what Beever often does, is to adopt a 
broad description of one land use and a narrow description of another. 
B  Internal Incoherence 
As we have seen, Beever’s account is not really about the prioritisation of 
property rights. But there is a reason why Beever presents it as if it is. In other 
writings he has insisted that tort law is concerned with a violation of rights. 
He reiterates this view in The Law of Private Nuisance,93 but he has a hard time 
squaring it with the view presented in the book. As a result, at times it seems 
Beever has two different accounts going on — one based on breaches of 
rights, the other based on land use priority — and though he tries to show 
they are completely consistent with each other, they are not. Rather, it seems 
that he brings in the rights perspective in cases where the land use priority 
account does not yield the outcome he wants. 
For an example, recall the dispute between the two hotels in Fontainebleau. 
The Court described the right in the following terms: ‘adjoining landowners 
have an equal right under the law to build to the line of their respective tracts 
and to such a height as is desired by them (in the absence, of course, of 
building restrictions or regulations)’.94 This is inconsistent with the priority of 
land use view, because access to sunlight is not a land use. To overcome this 
difficulty, Beever reads the case as if it is concerned with the question whether 
one has a ‘right to sunbathe’.95 He does that despite the fact that this right is 
nowhere mentioned in the case, and is not at all the right that the land owner 
in the case is interested in. Limited liability companies being incorporeal 
entities have little interest in lying ‘exposed before the elements on loungers’.96 
What the plaintiff in this case was interested in was to use nuisance law as a 
way of hampering a commercial competitor, and, unsurprisingly, the Court 
 
 93 Ibid 48–51. 
 94 Fontainebleau, 114 So 2d 357, 360 (Horton CJ for the Court) (Fla Ct App, 1959). 
 95 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 49. 
 96 Ibid. 
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refused to play along. It is less than helpful to present it as a dispute over the 
existence of a ‘right to sunbathe’. 
In any event, though Beever presents his view as consistent with a rights-
based understanding of tort law, when he comes to considering actual cases, 
Beever’s discussion looks different. To justify the conclusion in Fontainebleau, 
he says that ‘the desire [to expose oneself to the sun] is itself irrelevant as the 
claimant had no right that [this desire] be fulfilled’.97 So according to Beever, 
the reason why the plaintiff lost is not because sunbathing is a less fundamen-
tal land use than another, unspecified, land use, but because the plaintiff does 
not have a right to access to sunlight. 
Whether true or not, this claim is not about land use priority; it is none-
theless worth examining. If I engage in a more fundamental land use than my 
neighbour — say, if I engage in the ‘normal’ activities of a household (which 
presumably include lounging in my backyard) and my neighbour is using 
their property to make a profit — then according to Beever my activity is 
more fundamental.98 Now, if my activity is more fundamental, then why do I 
not have a right to access the natural resources necessary for making this 
activity possible? Or, presented differently, why can the person engaged in the 
less fundamental activity do something in pursuit of that activity if they 
thereby hamper my ability to engage in my more fundamental land use? Why 
does the right of the person engaged in the more fundamental land use not 
extend that far? Beever apparently thinks the answer is obvious, as he does not 
address it; but to paraphrase Holmes, the very thing to be found out is 
whether there is a right or not, and if not, why not.99  
To see that this is a serious problem and not mere nitpicking, compare 
Fontainebleau with Christie. In the latter case, as presented by Beever, the 
plaintiffs wanted to play music on their property, something which they are 
entitled to do and which the defendant in no way stopped them from doing. 
They further desired access to a peaceful environment that enabled them to 
play music properly, but if we follow Beever’s reading of Fontainebleau, we 
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should say that they did not have a right that that desire be fulfilled. In both 
cases it was the engagement in the less fundamental activity (running a hotel 
business, banging on walls) that made it more difficult for the plaintiff to 
engage in a more fundamental activity by depriving access to a necessary 
environmental condition (sunlight, silence). Yet for no apparent reason, 
Beever employs the rights-based account only when discussing Fontainebleau. 
In short, rather than these cases supporting Beever’s view, they show that 
Beever has two inconsistent accounts. 
C  The Problem of Presentation 
Whatever force Beever’s approach seems to have depends on his presentation 
of the cases, not in anything about the cases themselves. This point can be 
illustrated by another famous case Beever discusses, Hollywood Silver Fox 
Farm Ltd v Emmett.100 The plaintiff company was in the business of breeding 
silver foxes. The defendant, following a dispute with the plaintiff, fired guns on 
his property thereby causing vixens not to mate or miscarry. The plaintiff 
successfully sued in nuisance to enjoin the defendant from doing so. Trying to 
fit this case within his land use priority perspective, Beever says: 
If the defendant’s son shot rabbits [in order to maintain their land] … then the 
appropriate description of that activity would have been, not simply shooting, 
but shooting in order to maintain the integrity of the land. In that case, the de-
fendant’s use would have been more fundamental than the claimant’s.101 
Beever’s claim here is problematic on his own account. He describes protec-
tive measures presumably undertaken in order to enable a certain land use as 
the land use itself. If the land is used as a factory, then that is what the land is 
used for; if guards have to fire a gun to scare off potential vandals who try to 
damage the factory, that does not change the ‘most accurat[e]’ description of 
the land use in question.102 It clearly does not become, at the moment of 
shooting, ‘maintaining the integrity of the land’ and change into something 
else a moment later. The shooting in this context is ancillary to the land use 
itself, and presumably should be assessed in relation to it. (The shooting can 
 
 100 [1936] 2 KB 468. For more on the place of malice in nuisance, see above n 82. 
 101 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 56. 
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only be deemed as the most accurate description of the land use if the land 
was used as a shooting range or hunting ground.) If the ‘integrity of the land’ 
is maintained in order to allow for a non-fundamental land use, it is hard to 
see maintaining of land as itself a valuable land use. 
Thus, even on Beever’s own terms, his explanation of this case fails. 
Beever’s argument is nonetheless revealing: to the extent that his conclusion 
has any appeal it is due to the way he set up the example in a manner that 
incorporates factors that have no place in his ‘official’ account. The obvious 
reason why we feel differently about the two scenarios is because shooting for 
the sole reason of damaging a neighbour’s business is a socially useless (or 
positively harmful) activity; protecting land from going to waste is socially 
valuable and therefore deserving of protection. 
D  Implausible Outcomes 
In a 1629 nuisance case one of the judges stated that ‘each case would be 
governed by the local circumstances’.103 Ever since, courts have insisted that 
the finding of a nuisance is a contextual, fact-rich, determination dependent 
on a long list of considerations: the time of the alleged nuisance, its length, its 
intensity, the neighbourhood in which it takes place, the number of people 
affected, the respective benefits of the competing activities, and so on. Though 
these factors can be stated in the abstract, they manifest themselves very 
differently in different cases and so taking them into account rails against any 
attempt to conclusively prioritise certain activities as more fundamental than 
others. Society must have both private households and industry, and it is close 
to meaningless to speak in the abstract of one activity being more fundamen-
tal than another. What the law should seek to do is make sure that both can 
co-exist, attempting to minimise potential conflicts between them. 
One might object to the point just made that it is all very well to try and 
minimise conflicts between land uses, but nuisance law is necessary precisely 
where such efforts fail. At that point the law must determine which activity is 
more fundamental, and at that moment it is obvious that ‘normal occupation’ 
is more fundamental than business. Though superficially appealing, the 
following example illustrates why this is not the case. Property being cheap 
near heavy industry, I buy a building in an industrial zone, planning to turn it 
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into a sizable mansion. The only thing getting in my way of enjoying my new 
abode is the noise and bad odours emanating from the surrounding factories. 
Fortunately, I come across The Law of Private Nuisance and see a way out of 
my predicament: as already mentioned, Beever states that ‘[i]t must be clear 
that [the normal occupation of a room] is more fundamental to property than 
the [use of machinery]’,104 and further argues that coming to the nuisance is 
no defence.105 Reading this, I go to court asking for an injunction against the 
operation of all factories in the area surrounding my new home. It is clear that 
such a claim will fail. According to the ‘conventional view’ this is because the 
defendants’ use of their land is reasonable for its neighbourhood (while mine 
is possibly unreasonable). Since for Beever this is an irrelevant factor, and 
since my land use is more fundamental than that of my neighbours’, he has a 
problem.106 The closest Beever gets to addressing this problem is his sugges-
tion that a defendant could claim an easement by prescription to noise and 
pollution.107 In my example, it would mean claiming the right to an easement 
that would allow the nuisance, because of the existence of a nuisance against 
previous owners. 
Unfortunately, this solution is unlikely to work. For an easement by pre-
scription to be created, it has to be shown (among other things) that the land 
use in question was adverse to the property rights of neighbours, that the land 
use constituted ‘a wrong against the owner or occupier of the putative servient 
land — normally trespassing’.108 Thus, consent to the nuisance vitiates the 
creation of the easement, and mutual consent to some level of pollution and 
noise is presumably what happens in an industrial zone. The same conclusion 
is reached within Beever’s own account: since all previous land uses were 
equally fundamental (all were factories), there was no nuisance before and 
therefore no basis for the creation of easement by prescription. Even overcom-
ing this hurdle, no easement could be prescribed if the industrial area existed 
for less than the minimum required time for creating such a property right 
(typically, 20 years). Thus, this scenario poses an obvious, and seemingly 
devastating, problem for Beever’s approach. Beever could, of course, admit 
 
 104 Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance, above n 10, 44. 
 105 Ibid 65–7. 
 106 Cf ibid 66. 
 107 Ibid 68. 
 108 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] AC 822, 839 [46] (Lord Neuberger PSC). 
2015] Land Use Priorities and the Law of Nuisance 375 
 
that nuisance law and the law of easements cannot deal with such a case, and 
that such a scenario shows why zoning laws are required. But such a response 
would amount to an admission that commutative justice and private law alone 
are inadequate for governing interpersonal relations between individuals, 
contrary to the rallying cry in all of Beever’s writings on private law. If, on the 
other hand, Beever accepted the necessity of (public) zoning laws to address 
such problems with his account, he would have to explain how nuisance law 
meshes with them, as well as with all other regulatory schemes that exist in 
the modern state. 
E  Implausible Theory 
Though Beever never formulates it in this way, if one wanted to reconcile his 
land use priority view with a rights perspective it would look something like 
this: A has a right that B not use B’s land in a less fundamental way than A’s 
own use, if doing so interferes with A’s (more fundamental) use. A different way 
of understanding this view is that embedded within the concept of a property 
right is a list of land use priorities. I am not familiar with any text, legal or 
philosophical, that discusses nuisance in such a way, and though Beever 
claims that in his other work he claimed to be reviving ‘forgotten’ thinking,109 
I am not familiar with, and Beever definitely does not provide, any evidence to 
show that anything like this idea has ever been part of the common law. 
There are very good reasons why. Essentially, Beever has a trespassory view 
of nuisance. It is part of the concept of property (he would say) that it includes 
the right to exclude. This right is violated whenever someone physically enters 
into another’s property; but since land use priority is part of the concept of 
property, a land owner’s rights are similarly violated whenever someone 
engages in a conflicting, lower-ranked land use. ‘Trespass’ is on this view what 
we call a violation of one’s property rights by physical entry; ‘nuisance’ is what 
we call a violation of one’s property rights by notional entry. 
Beever never explicitly says that he seeks to turn nuisance into a variant of 
trespass to land, but there are several clear indications that this is the gist of 
his view. He says that nuisance is better understood as belonging to the law of 
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property,110 and insists (contrary to the case law in nuisance, but like the tort 
of trespass) that liability for nuisance must be strict. But there is a reason why 
the law treats trespass and nuisance differently and why the latter includes 
certain reasonableness requirements that are not found in the former. Physical 
intrusions are usually easy to detect and relatively easy to protect against; the 
law thus deals with them with ‘prioritisation’ of sorts: the property right 
holder’s decision on who to let in is typically given absolute priority over those 
of others. Nuisance law deals with an almost endless myriad of uses to which 
lands can be put. For this reason, the law does not seek to specify in advance 
how all such interactions should be resolved. It urges individuals to adjust 
their behaviours to the circumstances through mutual accommodation (‘live 
and let live’), and leaves determination of unresolved disputes to a court 
evaluation that takes the particular facts of the case into account.111 The 
distinction between trespass and nuisance thus acknowledges that an a priori 
determination of land use priorities — effectively the turning of nuisance into 
a species of trespass — is likely to weaken property rights. 
This may seem paradoxical at first. By turning nuisance into a kind of 
trespass to land, Beever’s approach seems to strengthen individuals’ property 
rights, for under his approach land uses will no longer be the subject to any 
reasonableness tests. The rigid a priori ranking of land uses seems at first to 
provide a degree of clarity that nuisance law lacks. But unless his proposals are 
accompanied by zoning laws, Beever’s approach would make the ensuing 
property regime a nightmare for individuals living in modern society. That is 
because every individual who is protected by nuisance from intrusions is also 
a potential source of nuisance to others. Under the prevailing understanding, 
one can avoid creating a nuisance by behaving in a ‘reasonable’ way in a 
particular neighbourhood. By contrast, with its strict prioritisation, Beever’s 
approach will require individuals to master a complex and rigid list of land 
use priorities; in addition, and far more seriously, it will require them to be 
familiar with the land uses of all their neighbours and be ready to alter their 
land use if one of their neighbours shifts to a higher-ranked land use. The 
effect of this approach will be to subject a person’s permissible land uses to 
changes in their neighbours’ land uses. In a densely populated modern 
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environment the only way to prevent this approach from turning into a 
nightmare would be by adopting zoning laws that would keep different land 
uses to different locations. Once again, then, we see that Beever’s view of 
nuisance can only be sustained if accompanied by regulation. The following 
Part expands on this point. 
IV  N U I S A N C E  LAW  F O R  T H E  A G E  O F  STAT U T E S 
In his perceptive review of Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise,112 Patrick 
Atiyah complained that Fried’s examples involve ‘situation[s] in which 
two individuals are face to face and make a bargain of the very simplest 
character — my cow Rose for your $80’.113 This, as Atiyah pointed out, is not 
what many real-world contracts look like. The same can be said of Beever’s 
book: his examples suggest that nuisance law deals with the kind of neighbour 
disputes found in cases like Christie or Sturges v Bridgman.114 In such cases, 
Beever says, all that the judge has to do is identify the more fundamental land 
use and rule accordingly. 
Such cases may lend themselves to an approach that ignores broader social 
considerations, but courts have long recognised that the kind of disputes they 
have to deal with are often more complex. It was accepted in the 1629 case 
mentioned earlier that a judge could say that ‘what is necessary for the 
common wealth shall never be called a nuisance to any private person’ and 
that ‘[i]n every nuisance we ought principally to pay regard to the public 
good’.115 This statement reflects what may be the underlying rationale for 
nuisance law, namely the coordination of two beneficial but conflicting 
activities.116 The rules with regard to locale, famously captured by the slogan 
that ‘what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so 
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in Bermondsey’,117 can be understood as an early attempt to do just that, to 
establish different zoning areas by means of nuisance law.118 
Unfortunately, like the rest of the common law, nuisance is a rather primi-
tive regulatory tool, and what was true in 1629 is of far greater significance 
today. The limitations of the common law method in dealing with the kind of 
problems previously addressed by nuisance law have led legislatures all over 
the world to adopt a new approach. Technological and social developments 
have made modern life far more complex (much higher population density, 
industrialisation, a larger number of encounters with strangers); on the other 
hand, they have also improved our understanding of the effects of pollution, 
and have created better means for dealing with old problems. As a result the 
focus has shifted from tinkering with the law of nuisance and in favour of 
addressing the problem by means of ‘regulation’. Instead of an ex post, case-
by-case treatment of conflicts using vague standards, legislatures have opted 
to create enforceable prescriptions that seek to minimise problems arising in 
the first place. In the context of nuisance, all common law countries have 
supplemented their nuisance law with more precise measurements of levels of 
pollution (noise, smells, particles, and so on) based on scientific data and 
subject to governmental inspections. With rare exceptions, common law 
countries have also used regulation to designate different geographical areas 
for different land uses. 
This is important for understanding the place and role of private nuisance 
today. Beever claims his book to be a guide for thinking about nuisance law 
for our times, even though we live ‘[i]n an era of regulation’.119 But to under-
stand what a law is one needs to understand what it is for; and to understand 
that, one needs to know more about what may be called its ‘normative 
neighbourhood’. In other words, what nuisance law is depends in part on the 
available alternatives to it. Therefore, to discuss 19th century nuisance cases, 
before the advent of the modern regulatory state, and to seek to learn from 
them what nuisance law is today, is bound to lead to an inaccurate picture of 
present-day law. 
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It is the normative neighbourhood that surrounds nuisance law today that 
explains why when one looks at the cases of nuisance that make it to the 
courts these days, one finds them dealing with very different matters than the 
neighbour disputes which Beever’s land use prioritisation approach envisages. 
What one finds is litigation involving many people (sometimes hundreds) 
regarding the use of wind farms,120 mass pollution created by factories,121 the 
effects of adding a runway to an international airport,122 and so on. Such 
disputes have several features that make it almost impossible to apply Beever’s 
approach to them, even if we wanted to. First, it is considerably more difficult 
to apply the land use prioritisation view to these cases, in part precisely 
because of their novelty or rarity. Where, for example, does a wind farm figure 
in the list of land use priorities? And how are we to describe it: do we think of 
it as protecting the environment or as the operation of machinery? If it is 
privately owned, is it to be ranked like other profit-making activities? And 
where does a flight path rank in the list that prioritises land uses? Second, a 
central facet of many presently-litigated cases is that they require the evalua-
tion of the relationships between the common law tort of private nuisance and 
statutory norms regarding permissible levels of pollution, planning and 
zoning laws, permits issued by planning authorities, and so on. Beever’s 
approach says little about how these considerations are to figure in his land 
use prioritisation view. Third, Beever’s focus on disputes between two 
neighbours means he does not address the special difficulties that arise in 
situations involving many plaintiffs or defendants. Is it enough that a single 
person living under the flight path to a new runway can show he is engaged in 
a more fundamental land use (even if hundreds of others cannot) for the 
competing activity to be enjoined? In addition to this problem, such cases 
typically involve collective action problems that Beever’s focus on one-on-one 
scenarios does not address. 
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These specific questions pertaining to Beever’s views are facets of a more 
general question: what is the role of nuisance in the age of regulation? The 
existence of statute changes the common law by ‘freeing’ it from a need to 
serve as the main tool for dealing with the problem of conflicting land uses. 
When someone violates clear noise level regulations, it would be far more 
difficult (and therefore pointless) for her neighbour to prove a nuisance. The 
other side of the coin is that typically compliance with a regulation will also 
exonerate a defendant from a nuisance claim. 
Does this render nuisance law redundant? I believe the best way to under-
stand the contemporary role of nuisance law is as a means for dealing with 
those cases that fall between the cracks of regulation. As such, it has a largely 
residual, but not insignificant, role. Regulation will be inadequate when new 
technologies outpace regulators,123 when new discoveries reveal new risks 
from existing technologies that call for swift action,124 or as an ex post 
response to attempts to circumvent regulations by exploiting loopholes found 
in them. In addition, courts may also use nuisance to impose higher standards 
than those set by statute or by-law, if an adequate regulation is poorly 
enforced. More controversially, courts may use nuisance to set higher stand-
ards than those found in regulation if they have reason to suspect that 
regulatory capture has resulted in the adoption of excessively low standards. It 
is such scenarios that explain the point of maintaining a common law 
(ex post) form of regulation in an age dominated by the ‘regulatory’ (ex ante) 
form of regulation. 
Beever may think all this is wrong — he may think that even in present 
times nuisance should be understood completely independently of regulation; 
or he may be highly suspicious (as some of his work suggests)125 of govern-
ment regulation and think that a better understanding of common law rules 
could better address many of the problems nowadays dealt with by regulation. 
Be all that as it may, it is still the case that to the extent he wishes to provide a 
useful account for nuisance law for our times, he has to take into account the 
realities of our present-day world. Without it, Beever’s book will be difficult to 
apply to problems in the real world. 
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V  ON  T H E  R O L E  O F  LE G A L  A C A D E M I C S 
Cases tend to focus on the particular with relatively little information about 
the broader social context of the decision, so it is natural to think of them, 
especially those that deal with common law areas of law, as less sophisticated 
versions of the kind of exercises in a priori reflection that moral philosophers 
engage in when dealing with the morality governing the interactions between 
individuals. When one adopts this view, it is tempting to think that courts’ 
appeals to policy are a failure of nerve, a departure from what they should be 
doing. Beever’s The Law of Private Nuisance is premised on precisely this view, 
a view that in turn informs Beever’s views on what legal academics should be 
doing. Their ‘primary function’, he says, ‘is not simply to learn the decided 
cases but to make sense out of what they find. In that way, the legal academy 
performs the same function — aiding understanding — as the rest of the 
university and appropriately serves the rest of the legal community’.126 
This is a far too narrow and old fashioned (19th century?) conception of the 
university. Among the most vibrant and important departments in today’s 
university are engineering departments, and those who study and teach there 
will be puzzled by Beever’s claims, because they will not recognise in them 
what they do. I would not want to restrict academic work to a single approach, 
but I think looking at what engineers do allows us to see what is, at the very 
least, a viable alternative to the role Beever assigns to legal academics, and one 
that I think can prove immensely illuminating.127 I have already implicitly 
used an engineering perspective when I suggested that in thinking about what 
nuisance law is we should think about what it does, and that in thinking about 
what it does, we should think about nuisance in relation (and in contrast to) 
other available normative tools. More generally, my critique of Beever’s 
approach can be described as an attempt to solve modern-day problems using 
ancient technology. 
Adopting the engineering perspective can sometimes be used in support of 
a simpler standard that is easier to implement, rather than a complex one that 
is difficult for the courts to apply, even if the former is less accurate. One 
might therefore attempt to salvage Beever’s approach by suggesting that it has 
the virtue of offering a simple rule, one that is easier to apply than any attempt 
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at evaluating the respective costs and benefits of conflicting activities. This is a 
familiar, ‘engineering’ argument against judicial appeal to ‘policy’, one that, 
ironically enough, often comes from those who would altogether dismiss the 
engineering analogy.128 
While it sometimes makes sense to adopt a simple legal prescription even 
if it is a less accurate one (to prefer, in familiar terminology, a ‘rule’ over a 
‘standard’), such a choice has obvious downsides. The rule that a plaintiff loses 
if his last name starts with an earlier letter in the alphabet than the defendant’s 
is clearly easy to apply, but it is not a good one. So the fact that questions of 
social welfare are more complex to decide than the question Beever wants 
judges to consider is not immediately a reason to prefer the latter. One should 
prefer a simpler decision rule if the costs of using it are smaller than 
the benefits of doing so. This is quite clearly not the case with Beever’s 
proposals. First, by imitating trespass, the prioritisation view has the appear-
ance of simplicity, but it is a misleading appearance. As we have seen, because 
of the difference in the kinds of intrusion involved in the two torts, the 
prioritisation interpretation of nuisance will make property ownership a far 
more complicated matter. Second, the claim that judges lack training or 
expertise in making policy decisions may sound convincing until one realises 
that judges also lack training and expertise in deciding in the abstract about 
land use priorities. I, for one, cannot think of anything in my legal education 
(or the time spent in law schools ever since) to help me answer this question. 
Third, it is not just that right now legal training does not cover the matter; 
the problem is that Beever is opaque on what judges could base their decisions 
on the matter on. Some easy cases, he says, are ‘obvious’, in others judges will 
have to rely on their ‘judgement’. As we have seen, this results in an easily 
manipulable test. 
 
 128 Beever argues that in deciding cases on the basis of policy ‘courts involve themselves with 
concerns that lie beyond their institutional competence’: Beever, Rediscovering the Law of 
Negligence, above n 5, 172. For someone who thinks courts have no training and evidence 
for making policy decisions, it is remarkable that Beever feels no compunctions about mak-
ing his own policy judgments: ‘it cannot be claimed that judicial law-making must be pre-
ferred because it is more efficient than the alternatives. It is not’: Beever, Forgotten Justice, 
above n 6, 300. Beever provides not a shred of empirical evidence for this statement, and his 
argument in support of this view (premise 1: ‘In many areas of life, rule in accordance with 
law … has been replaced by rule in accordance with the commands of administrative bodies’; 
premise 2: ‘This has been done primarily for reasons of efficiency’) clearly does not support 
his conclusion: Beever, Forgotten Justice, above n 6, 300. 
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In comparison with ‘policy’ this approach fares worse. When judges rely 
on ‘policy’ they often (though not always) refer to facts about the likely effects 
of the decision, on the parties themselves and on others. At least in this sense, 
it is hard to see any principled reason why such facts should be excluded from 
the legal decision-making process. To the extent that appellate court decisions 
constitute general rules it would be perverse to ask courts to ignore the 
possible effects of their decisions. True, estimates of the effects of legal rules 
are often known with less than perfect certainty, but the same is true of most 
facts that courts determine when deciding cases. Moreover, unlike the obscure 
‘judgements’ Beever wants judges to employ, such assessments are evidence-
based, with recognised experts on which legislatures and courts can rely. 
The more serious objection to the inclusion of these facts in judges’ deci-
sion-making processes is institutional, namely that the judicial process is not 
well-designed to provide such facts reliably: parties’ self-interest may encour-
age them to provide partial, self-serving data; in addition, the interests of 
those not part of the proceedings (but potentially affected by the decision) 
may be inadequately presented to the court. Courts around the world have 
recognised this problem and have partially addressed it by allowing ‘friends of 
the court’ to add their voice to judicial proceedings. That, however, is only 
a limited solution, and it is here that academics can prove particularly helpful 
to courts. Academics are being less than helpful when they encourage courts 
to ignore relevant information, especially when they do so by appealing to 
what the law used to be in the past (when living conditions were very different 
and information available to courts today was not available). The right lesson 
is that courts making general rules should be provided with better infor-
mation and academics should think much more seriously about how to make 
sure the judges have that information in accessible form. It is here, not in a 
priori speculations, that legal academics can prove particularly useful to 
courts and to society. 
